Role × plane → the complete required config set, checked as an admission policy at start-up.

Required-configuration-per-role manifest (admission policy on complete env)

Intent — Declare, per operating role and per plane it runs in, the complete set of configuration a process must have to start, as a typed manifest an admission check reads — then refuse to launch a process whose environment is missing any of its required set. A missing secret or unset variable fails loudly at admission, before the process does half its work and then fails quietly deep in a request (our instance: a dispatch-role × plane → required-env-var manifest that gates start-up when a role's set is incomplete).

SummaryRole × plane → the complete required config set, checked as an admission policy at start-up.
TargetBridge · System models
Formtyped-ir
Movepackage — a constraint shipped with its sensors
Modelis-a-model — a structured model you check a system property against
EnforcementHard (deterministic) — the manifest declares each role-and-plane's required set, and an admission check refuses to start a process whose environment omits any required entry
Derivationmodel-from-code — the required set is reconciled against what each role's code actually reads

Its place in the environment — a variant / known-use of Executable Source of Truth, under KNOW · Maintain authoritative system knowledge. Preserved here for its technical texture; the construction kit shows how it folds.

Motivation — the failure it kills

A process needs a scatter of configuration — API keys, service tokens, admin secrets, endpoint URLs — and which it needs depends on what role it plays and which plane it runs in. Locally a subset suffices; in production a different subset is mandatory; a background role needs tokens a foreground one does not. When the required set lives only as implicit knowledge, the failure mode is the worst kind of quiet: the process starts fine, runs until it reaches the one code path that reads the missing variable, and then fails — a 403 on an admin endpoint, an auth failure between services, an alt-text call that silently returns nothing because the key was never set. The environment was incomplete from the first second, but nothing checked completeness at the boundary, so the gap surfaces late, far from its cause, and often only under the specific request that touches it.

Why it's not just reading an env var when you need it

Reading a variable at its point of use, and failing if it's absent, catches the gap — but at the worst possible time: after the process is admitted, mid-request, once for each missing variable, in whatever order the code paths happen to fire. The manifest moves the check to admission: the complete required set for this role-and-plane is known before the process does any work, so an incomplete environment is refused at the boundary, once, with the full list of what's missing. That is the difference between a scattered runtime KeyError and an admission policy. The manifest also makes completeness a checkable property, which per-site reads never can: no single getenv call knows the whole set a role requires, so no per-site check can say "this environment is complete for this role." Only a declared set can, and only a declared set reconciled against what the role's code actually reads stays honest as the requirements change.

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Governed by

The mechanisms that hold this model true — inverted from their Governs edges at build time, never hand-written. A direct governor names this model; a trunk mechanism governs every model.